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Churchill’s Personal Diplomacy: A Lot of Effort for Limited Success
Churchill’s Personal Diplomacy: A Lot of Effort Grey for permission to meet with Admiral Alfred von
Tirpitz in May 1914. While Grey refused, Churchill’s
for Limited Success
Klaus Larres impressively traces Winston efforts show how he “sought to set up informal conChurchill’s political career from his early positions ferences without any strict agenda but with himself
in the British government starting in 1908 to his res- at the center of attention to further world peace and,
ignation as prime minister in 1955 and argues that above all, ensure Britain’s continued status as a great
the famous leader actively pursued personal diplo- power” (p. 28).
>From the start of World War I to the start of
World War II, Churchill had few opportunities to engage in personal diplomacy but never lost his desire to
do so. After Germany attacked Poland in September
1939, Churchill immediately began to develop a relationship with Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Britain’s
desperate situation in 1940 and 1941 led Churchill to
turn to the United States for as much support as possible. “The high point of Churchill’s personal diplomacy,” Larres claims, “was achieved in the course of
the Second World War. In 1940-41 his influence and
powers of persuasion were decisive in securing Washington’s assistance for a beleaguered Britain” (p. 34).
This success was not entirely emulated through the
remainder of the war. Despite his efforts to maintain a close relationship with Roosevelt and to cultivate one with Joseph Stalin during the war, Churchill
faced great difficulties. Differences in American and
British goals grew as the United States emerged as
the senior partner in the Anglo-American partnership; Stalin and other Soviet officials never trusted
Churchill because of the prime minister’s virulent
anti-communism before the war; and Churchill’s failure to seek advice from within his own government
often led to conflicting agendas.

macy and summitry while in office. He stresses that
Churchill’s personal diplomacy was “an imaginative
and perhaps even visionary policy through which he
attempted to reverse his country’s declining fortunes
and prevent or undo major catastrophes before the
First World War, in the course of the Second World
War and during the Cold War years” (p. xx). While
Churchill was not always successful in his efforts, Larres asserts that recognizing his continuous pursuit of
personal diplomacy provides a lens through which to
understand his policies and actions. Although Larres
at times overstates Churchill’s commitment to personal diplomacy, his study does effectively illustrate a
fairly consistent effort by Churchill to preserve Great
Britain’s power position in the world and to resolve
disputes through face-to-face diplomacy.
Larres opens his study with an examination of
when and how Churchill attempted to use personal
diplomacy before World War I and then in World War
II. His purpose is to show that Churchill’s commitment to personal diplomacy was long-lived and was
not a product of the early Cold War. Larres’s first
example showing Churchill’s personal diplomacy occurred in 1908 when the future prime minister joined
with David Lloyd George in attempts to initiate talks
with Germany. Although these efforts failed, they did
not stop Churchill from continuing to pursue personal
diplomacy after the 1911 Agadir crisis and his appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty in October
of the same year. His last effort before the start of the
First World War was to ask Foreign Secretary Edward

Churchill’s defeat in July 1945 left him as the
head of the Conservative Party but with little voice
in British policy making. However, Larres sees
much continuity in Churchill’s thinking throughout
his leadership of the opposition party. Larres claims
the former prime minister had three goals in terms
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of waging the Cold War: preserving Britain’s status
as a world power, standing firm against communism,
and preserving peace by having summits where the
United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union
could overcome their differences through personal discussions between the key leaders. What is interesting
about these goals is that Churchill “never explained
how such negotiations would lead to a relaxation of
tension and perhaps even to an end of the Cold War.
He remained silent on the question of which topics
were to be raised at a summit and in what sequence
they were to be discussed” (p. 137).

The summit amounted to nothing as no one, besides
Churchill, had high hopes for achieving any significant agreements or developing a concerted plan to
wage the Cold War. In fact, the summit’s main consequence was making all of its participants “aware of
Churchill’s increasing frailty” (p. 309).
Churchill remained in office another sixteen
months, but his influence at home and abroad was increasingly marginalized. Everyone within the British
government wanted him to step down.
Harold
Macmillan saw him as “now quite incapable–mentally
as well as physically–of remaining Prime Minister” (p.
349). In the United States, Eisenhower increasingly
attempted to bypass Churchill and develop a relationship with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, the
heir to the leadership of the Conservative Party. The
Soviet Union continued to mistrust any of Churchill’s
initiatives. The only one who failed to realize the situation was Churchill himself. However, he ultimately
did decide to step aside and resigned in April 1955.

Churchill’s time as the head of the opposition provided few opportunities for his summit goals to be implemented. However, his re-election as prime minister
in October 1951 set the stage for almost four years
of concerted efforts to bring an end to the Cold War
through the use of personal diplomacy. “Churchill,”
Larres asserts, “concentrated almost exclusively on
summit diplomacy and related issues. He neglected
nearly all other external and domestic matters” (p.
Larres has made an important contribution to our
155). Unfortunately for Churchill, none of the other
understanding of Churchill and Great Britain’s role
major leaders–Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower,
in the early Cold War. His study shows the struggle
Joseph Stalin and his successors, and officials within
of one leader who attempted “to maintain Britain’s
his own party–showed much interest.
continued place in the sun” (p. 391). However, there
Larres stresses that “the period after Stalin’s are certain issues that Larres could have addressed
death would prove to be the high-point of Churchill’s more clearly and/or systematically. His definition
post-war pursuit of summit diplomacy” (pp. 190- of personal diplomacy is rather narrow. From Lar191). Churchill attempted to take the initiative and res’s perspective, Churchill’s personal diplomacy was
arrange a summit but faced major opposition from between himself and other world leaders. However,
within his own party, the United States, and other al- there are different levels of diplomacy or at least polies. Furthermore, the prime minister “entirely failed litical negotiations. Did Churchill use the same type
to understand the suspicion with which he was re- of personal diplomacy to solve domestic issues? It
garded in Moscow. Stalin’s successors had been in would seem that if Churchill consistently used perimportant leadership positions during the war, and sonal diplomacy in pursuing foreign policies, he probBritish policy in 1940-41, which the Kremlin regarded ably used it in domestic matters. Since Churchill was
as a devious attempt by Churchill to provoke the So- involved in domestic issues throughout his career, evviet Union to fight Hitler’s Germany on behalf of the idence of continuity in his use of personal diplomacy
West, was still remembered with much resentment in there would have produced a more convincing arguMoscow” (p. 217). Despite the opposition, Churchill ment.
possibly had a chance at achieving his goal of orgaThere are other smaller problems with Larres’s
nizing a summit of the key heads of state in the early
arguments or at least their presentation. While
summer of 1953. However, his efforts came to naught
Churchill’s efforts to use personal diplomacy with
after the Soviet Union crushed the East German upother leaders, in particular with summits, is clear,
rising in June 1953, and he suffered a debilitating
his interaction at these meetings is left vague. How
stroke a few days later.
did Churchill act at these meetings? What were the
In response to an initiative by Soviet leader Vy- relationships between leaders like? Larres tends to foacheslav Molotov, Churchill was able to arrange cus on Churchill’s desire for personal diplomacy and
one last summit involving the United States, Great the results of meetings that did occur without showBritain, and France in Bermuda in December 1953. ing in much detail what Churchill’s personal diplo2
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macy actually meant when he was face-to-face with
another leader. Two examples of this are Larres’s
discussions of Churchill’s relationship with Roosevelt
in 1940-41 and the prime minister’s activities at the
1953 Bermuda Conference. Larres describes the first
example as the high point of all of Churchill’s personal diplomacy, yet there is no discussion of the
interaction between the two leaders. The Bermuda
Conference was Churchill’s last summit, but Larres

spends little time exploring Churchill’s efforts once
the conference began. Larres would have been more
convincing if he had shown how Churchill attempted
to use his personal persuasive powers.
Despite these few misgivings, Larres deserves high
praise for his impressive research, lucid arguments,
and well-crafted prose. Anyone studying Churchill,
twentieth-century British diplomacy, and the early
Cold War will need to consult this work.
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